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ESSAYS

WHY DON’T PUNITIVE DAMAGES PUNISH OR DETER?
BEYOND THE CONSTITUTION TOWARD
AN ECONOMIC SOLUTION
Paige Griffith*

[T]o best advance the State’s interest in deterrence, juries must be given unbridled discretion to render awards that are wildly unpredictable.
—Justice Harry A. Blackmun1

I.

INTRODUCTION

In 2014, two Montana district court judges declared Montana Code
Annotated § 27–1–220(3) unconstitutional.2 In May 2015, another district
court declared Montana’s punitive damages statute unconstitutional.3 Two
months later, on July 1, 2015, the Montana Supreme Court issued an order
regarding the appeal in Masters Group International, Inc. v. Comerica
* Third-year law student, Alexander Blewett III School of Law at the University of Montana.
This article was inspired by my work with the Williams Law Firm in Missoula, Montana. I would like to
thank my constitutional law professor, Anthony Johnstone, and my classmate, Lucas Hamilton, for their
help and support.
1. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 59 (1991).
2. Butte Local Dev. Corp. v. Masters Grp. Int’l, Inc., No. DV-11-372, 2014 WL 2895577 (Mont.
Dist. March 25, 2014) (“This case is an example of the capricious nature of the cap. While 3% or $10
million may be an effective deterrent to similar conduct to some defendants, to a party like Comerica
with its substantial wealth, $10.5 million is a minuscule amount and likely provides minimal deterrent or
none at all.”); Olsen v. Hyundai Motor Co., No. DV 11-304, 2014 WL 5040001 (Mont. Dist. Sept. 19,
2014).
3. Order, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Entry of Final Judgment, Kelly Logging, Inc.,
v. First Interstate Bank, No. DV-12-928, 2015 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 82, at *39–40 ((Mont. Dist. Apr. 21,
2015) (the district court judge upheld a jury verdict of 58:1 punitive damages to compensatory damages,
with $16,760,000.00 in punitive damages valued above the statutory limitation)).
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Bank4—which included a constitutional question on Montana’s punitive
damages cap—but, due to a choice-of-law conflict, remanded the case back
to the district court to apply Michigan law. Thus, the Court rendered no
opinion on Montana’s punitive damages statute.5 Without any interpretation
of the statute from Montana’s highest Court, the constitutionality of Montana’s punitive damages cap continues to be an issue for future litigants.
This article will analyze recent scholarly arguments for and against
punitive damages, discuss how those arguments specifically relate to exemplary awards in Montana, and extend the analysis to address the economic
deterrence effect. First, the paper will give a brief history on punitive damages and examine the basic constitutional interpretations concerning punitive damages. Next, broadening the perspective to other states’ punitive
damages statutes, the paper will analyze the legal and economic rationality
of different statutory limits on punitive damages. Looking specifically at
Montana, the paper will turn to Montana Code Annotated § 27–1–220(3)
and explain the inefficiency of Montana’s punitive damages cap. The paper
will then examine the economic theory of deterrence and explain why economic deterrence is critical to consider when drafting punitive damages
statutes.
Finally, the paper hypothesizes a potential economic solution that offers a more simplified equation for adjudicators to use to determine an optimal punitive damages award on a case-by-case basis. This economic solution achieves three advantages over the current state of punitive damages:
first, it emulates the current United States Supreme Court precedent and
constitutional doctrine concerning punitive damages while eliminating the
nebulous post-verdict review of each individual award; second, it allows for
defendants to easily predict what liability they may face; and, third, it proposes an ideal remedy if the Montana punitive damages statute is declared
unconstitutional.
II. BACKGROUND

OF

PUNITIVE DAMAGES

A. Brief History of Punitive Damages
In civil law, compensatory damages are paid from a defendant to a
plaintiff to compensate the plaintiff for loss, injury, or harm from the defen4. 352 P.3d 1101, 1116, 1124 (Mont. 2015).
5. Id. at 1118 (“In sum, we conclude that had the District Court applied Michigan law, Masters’
tort claims of constructive fraud, intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, and
deceit would not have been permitted to go to the jury as stand-alone tort claims. The District Court
therefore erred in allowing these claims to go to the jury. The additional conclusion follows that we must
vacate the jury’s award of $10.5 million in punitive damages. After the tort claims leave, the only claims
remaining are contractual in nature. Contract claims do not provide an avenue for punitive damages.”).
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dant’s misconduct.6 Sometimes, even nominal damages are included in an
award to recognize a technical harm or loss rather than an actual one.7 But
punitive damages are exemplary. These special damages serve a broader
societal interest in the world of civil litigation by punishing wrongdoers and
deterring future misconduct.8 Punitives, as derived from the word “punishment,” are issued to punish the defendant.9
Punitive damages have been a part of the American civil system since
1784.10 Historically, punitive damages were “rarely assessed” and often
very miniscule.11 When punitive damages were awarded they were comparable to compensatory damages, or slightly above the compensatory
amount.12 Yet, beginning in the 1960s and into the 1970s, punitive damages
took a leap from trivial to excessive.13 This was primarily due to courts
turning away from the “historical ‘intentional tort’ moorings of punitive
damages” and allowing exemplary awards for unintentional conduct, such
as at issue in product liability cases.14 By the late 1970s and 1980s, punitive
damages increased exponentially and awards were given in “‘unprecedented numbers.’”15 Juries awarded as much as 2,500 times the compensatory amount.16
B. The Constitutionality of Punitive Damages
Within the past quarter-century, after the height of punitive awards,
vast exemplary damages have become a controversial topic within the legal
community. Challengers confronted the courts with the constitutionality of
6. Lynda A. Sloane, The Split Award Statute: A Move Toward Effectuating the True Purpose of
Punitive Damages, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 473, 473 (1993); Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346,
358 (2007) (explaining that “compensatory damages are measured by the harm the defendant has caused
the plaintiff”).
7. Sloane, supra note 6, at 473.
8. Id. at 473–474.
9. Philip Morris USA, 549 U.S. at 359 (“There is little difference between the justification for a
criminal sanction, such as a fine or a term of imprisonment, and an award of punitive damages.”);
Sloane, supra note 6, at 473.
10. Jacqueline Perczek, On Efficiency, Punishment, Deterrence, and Fairness: A Survey of Punitive
Damages Law and A Proposed Jury Instruction, 27 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 825, 825 (1993).
11. Mark A. Behrens et. al., Calculating Punitive Damages Ratios with Extracompensatory Attorney Fees and Judgment Interest: A Violation of the United States Supreme Court’s Due Process Jurisprudence? 48 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1295, 1297 (2013) (citing Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Fairness and
Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1982)).
12. Id. at 1298.
13. John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., A Comment on the Constitutionality of Punitive Damages, 72 VA. L.
REV. 139, 141–142 (1986).
14. Behrens, supra note 11, at 1298 (quoting Victor E. Schwartz et al., Reining in Punitive Damages “Run Wild”: Proposals for Reform by Courts and Legislatures, 65 BROOK. L. REV. 1003, 1008
(2000)).
15. Id. (quoting Schwartz, supra note 14, at 1009).
16. Aetna Life Ins. v. LaVoie, 475 U.S. 813, 816 (1986).
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punitive damages under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.17 At first,
the United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of punitive
damages under the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment.18
Then, the seminal Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip19 decision in
1991 placed procedural due process safeguards and substantive due process
restrictions on excessive punitive awards.20
In Haslip, the Court assessed punitive damages to an insurance company for misappropriating insureds’ premium payments.21 Although Haslip
drew no specific bright line, the United States Supreme Court intended to
limit “grossly excessive” punitive damages awards because they violated
notions of fundamental fairness.22 Specifically, the Court held that “general
concerns of reasonableness” played the most crucial role in determining
whether a punitive damages award was constitutional.23 Focusing mostly on
procedural due process, the Court concluded that the trial court’s punitive
award of four times the compensatory amount was not unconstitutional due
to the complete procedural protections in place at the trial level.24 The
Court added that punitive damages awards “skirt[ing] the periphery of due
process” were likely unjustified and left the door open to constitutional
challenges.25
Within the next few years, two additional cases contributed to the debate on due process and punitive damages: TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp.26 and BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore.27 In
TXO, the Court found that a ratio of compensatory to punitive damages of
17. Perczek, supra note 10, at 833 (citing Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71,
75–76 (1988)).
18. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 447–450 (1989), abrogated by Hudson v. United States,
522 U.S. 93 (1997); Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 259–60
(1989).
19. 499 U.S. 1 (1991)
20. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 1; Behrens, supra note 11, at 1298.
21. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 4–7.
22. Id. at 18, 55 (“We need not, and indeed we cannot, draw a mathematical bright line between the
constitutionally acceptable and the constitutionally unacceptable that would fit every case.”).
23. Id. at 18 (“We can say, however, that general concerns of reasonableness and adequate guidance from the court when the case is tried to a jury properly enter into the constitutional calculus.”).
24. Id. at 23 (“Pacific Mutual thus had the benefit of the full panoply of Alabama’s procedural
protections. The jury was adequately instructed. The trial court conducted a post-verdict hearing that
conformed with Hammond. The trial court specifically found that the conduct in question “evidenced
intentional malicious, gross, or oppressive fraud,” App. to Pet. for Cert. A14, and found the amount of
the award to be reasonable in light of the importance of discouraging insurers from similar conduct, id.,
at A15. Pacific Mutual also received the benefit of appropriate review by the Supreme Court of Alabama. It applied the Hammond standards and approved the verdict thereunder. It brought to bear all
relevant factors recited in Hornsby.”).
25. Perczek, supra note 10, at 834.
26. 509 U.S. 443 (1993).
27. 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
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1:526 was constitutional.28 Echoing Haslip, the Court held no mathematical
formula would suffice across the board for determining the reasonableness
of a punitive damages award.29 Each case had to be decided on its own facts
and circumstances.30 Then came Gore. Gore finally gave clear guidance on
the excessiveness of a jury’s award of punitive damages. Punitive damages
were only to be “imposed to further a State’s legitimate interests in punishing unlawful conduct and deterring its repetition.”31 The Court provided a
three-part guideline for trial courts to determine if the jury’s punitive damages award was overly excessive:
(i) the degree of reprehensibility;
(ii) the disparity between the harm suffered and the punitive damage award;
and
(iii) the difference between this remedy and civil penalties authorized in
comparable cases.32

The Court further offered direction of a substantive due process violation in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell33—the
most notorious punitive damages case, found in all law school tort
casebooks. In Campbell, the plaintiffs brought a bad faith action against
State Farm, which resulted in a jury verdict of $2.6 million in compensatory
damages and $145 million in punitive damages.34 Focusing on the deterrent
and retributive nature of punitive awards, the Court concluded that the $145
million punitive damages award was presumptively inappropriate given the
facts of the case.35 Specifically, the Court noted that the reprehensibility of
the defendant’s conduct was the most important factor in determining the
reasonableness of a particular award.36 Aligning with its precedent, the
Court held “[t]he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the imposition of grossly excessive or arbitrary punishments on a
tortfeasor.”37 Extrapolating a broader standard from the facts of Campbell,
28. TXO Prod. Corp., 509 U.S. at 462.
29. Id. at 458 (citing Haslip, 499 U.S. at 18).
30. Id. at 457 (“[A] jury imposing a punitive damages award must make a qualitative assessment
based on a host of facts and circumstances unique to the particular case before it.”).
31. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996).
32. Id. at 574–583.
33. 538 U.S. 408, 416–417 (2003) (“ ‘Despite the broad discretion that States possess with respect
to the imposition of criminal penalties and punitive damages, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Federal Constitution imposes substantive limits on that discretion. To the extent an
award is grossly excessive, it furthers no legitimate purpose and constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of
property.”) (citing Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 433 (2001); Gore,
517 U.S. at 574).
34. Id. at 415. On post-verdict review, the trial court reduced the award to $1 million in compensatory damages and $25 in punitive damages.
35. Id. at 429.
36. Id. at 419 (“ ‘[T]he most important indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive damages award
is the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct.’ ”) (quoting Gore, 517 U.S. at 575).
37. Id. at 416.
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the Court also held “few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due
process.”38 Thus, any ratio higher than 1:9 would be presumptively unconstitutional.
C. Achieving Deterrence and Retribution
Effectively balancing the objectives of retribution and deterrence in a
punitive damages award is no easy feat. General deterrence is the “effect
that the prospect of having to pay damages will have on the behavior of
similarly situated parties in the future.”39 The focus of deterrence is to discourage morally repugnant—or simply economically inefficient—conduct
by a civil sanction, punitive damages. On the other hand, retribution satisfies the social need to punish wrongdoers beyond the cost imposed by compensatory damages.40 The retributive mechanism punishes the defendant
outright “when adequate criminal sanctions are not readily available.”41 It
also helps to restore public views that business behavior should observe the
same moral social norms as individuals.42 Deterrence and retribution are
often referred to as the “twin goals” of punitive damages.43 Yet, putting the
two goals together into an effective award on a case-by-case basis is virtually impossible.
A jury does not allocate a proportion of a punitive damages award to
retribution and another to deterrence; it is merely a lump sum amount.
Thus, assigning a number to deterrence and another to retribution is an im38. Id. at 425.
39. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 HARV.
L. REV. 869, 877 (1998).
40. Richard C. Ausness, Retribution and Deterrence: The Role of Punitive Damages in Products
Liability Litigation, 74 KY. L.J. 1, 39 (1985) (“[I]t is better to use the term “retribution” instead of
“punishment” to distinguish between the vindictive function of punitive damages and deterrence or other
utilitarian objectives”).
41. Ausness, supra note 40, at 5.
42. Id. at 39.
43. City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 266–267 (1981) (“Punitive damages . . .
are . . . intended to . . . punish the tortfeasor whose wrongful action was intentional or malicious, and to
deter him and others from similar extreme conduct.”); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350
(1974) (“[Punitive damages] are . . . private fines levied by civil juries to punish reprehensible conduct
and to deter its future occurrence.”); Exxon Ship. Co., 554 U.S. at 493 (“[J]uries are customarily instructed on twin goals of punitive awards.”); Spaur v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 510 N.W.2d 854,
867 (Iowa 1994) (explaining that the “ ‘aggregate award of punitive damages against [the defendant] has
been sufficient to meet the twin goals of punishment and deterrence’ for the entirety of the wrongful
conduct”) (quoting Dunn v. Hovic, 1 F.3d 1371, 1390 (3rd Cir. 1993)); Hollock v. Erie Ins. Exch., 842
A.2d 409, 419 (Pa. Super. 2004) (“[A] reasonable relationship must exist between the amount of the
punitive damage award and the twin goals of punishment and deterrence.”); Douglas G. Harkin, BMW of
North America, Inc. v. Gore: A Trial Judge’s Guide to Jury Instructions and Judicial Review of Punitive
Damage Awards, 60 MONT. L. REV. 367, 371–372 (1999) (citing Sabrina C. Turner, The Shadow of
BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 427, 429–431).
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perfect calculation. Consequently, when evidence is presented to a jury, attorneys focus on either deterrence or retribution and play to the emotions of
the jury in order to increase the amount of the award. Depending on
whether deterrence or retribution is more significant to the jury in a certain
case, each juror may weigh deterrence and retribution differently.
Take two highly publicized cases as examples.44 In 1978, Ford Motor
Company recalled 1.5 million of its Pinto automobiles due to the safety of
the car’s fuel system: the rear gas tank had a tendency to explode in rearend collisions.45 In 1968, during the car’s design stage, Ford conducted a
cost-benefit analysis on whether to fix the rear gas tank issue.46 Ford calculated that a human life was worth $200,000, but altering the gas tank design
of every vehicle at the cost of an additional $11 per vehicle was too high.47
In 1972, the Ford Pinto’s exploding gas tank killed Lilly Gray and severely
injured and burned 13-year-old Richard Grimshaw in an accident.48 Gray’s
estate and Grimshaw sued Ford and the jury awarded over $3 million compensatory damages and $125 million punitive damages.49 Ford moved for a
new trial, and as a condition of the denial of the motion, Grimshaw remitted
most of the punitive damages, reducing the punitive award to $3.5 million.50
The facts of Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co.51 are incredibly important
because the plaintiffs’ attorneys were able to focus on the retributive function of a punitive damages award. Ford was aware of the design defect
before production began but decided against changing the design based on a
cost-benefit calculation. With that analysis, Ford determined the risk of losing human lives was cheaper than the cost of redesigning the Pinto. Thus,
throughout the trial, the plaintiffs’ attorneys could ask the jury to punish
Ford for its failure to redesign the Pinto’s gas tank at the expense of human
lives—exemplifying the retributive function of punitive damages.

44. These cases are used as examples only to illustrate the deterrence and retribution functions of a
punitive damage award. The author’s use of these cases in no way represents the actual arguments of the
trial attorneys in these cases and is not reflective of their thoughts.
45. GAIL D. BAURA, ENGINEERING ETHICS: AN INDUSTRIAL PERSPECTIVE, at 45–46 (Elsevier Academic Press 2006).
46. Id. at 45.
47. Id. Ford valued this amount as of 1968. As a reference, the corollary in 2015 dollars is roughly
$1,362,166.67 according to the Consumer Price Index. See Bureau of Labor Statistics, CPI Inflation
Calculator, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., https://perma.cc/52N8-KYHW (last visited Jan. 21, 2016).
48. Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 359 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 1981).
49. Id. at 358. Grimshaw was awarded $2,516,000 in compensatory damages and $125 million
punitive damages, and the Grays were awarded $559,680 in compensatory damages.
50. Id.
51. 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 1981).
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Another example is Malcolm v. Evenflo Company,52 where the parents
of a child killed in a rollover car accident brought a strict products liability
action against Evenflo, the manufacturer of child safety seat, alleging defective design. In 1995, Evenflo’s internal testing indicated that the child seat
production model was prone to failure of both the plastic seat belt hooks
and the adjacent plastic shell.53 For years, Evenflo received various customer complaints about the defective car seat, which it chose to ignore.54 In
2000, Jessica Malcolm received this particular model of the Evenflo car
seat from a friend and called Evenflo to ask if the seat was safe to use.
Evenflo told her the seat was not subject to any of their recalls and that her
specific model was safe.55 Despite the company’s assurances, Malcolm’s
infant child, Tyler, died in a rollover accident while riding in the Evenflo
car seat.56 The child seat’s seatbelt hook broke off during the rollover, causing Tyler to be ejected from the vehicle while still strapped into the car
seat.57
The facts of the Evenflo case are horrific. An infant died due a manufacturer’s design defect, and the manufacturer knew the design had significant flaws. Evenflo not only chose to ignore the customer complaints about
the car seat, but also blatantly lied to the plaintiff when she asked the company about the seat’s safety. These facts show how deterrence can be
manipulated as an effective argument for punitive damages to a jury. Attorneys could argue that society must prevent infant deaths and hammer
throughout the trial the importance of deterring shoddy product design.
Thus, if the jury awards large punitive damages, it would deter Evenflo
from similar future conduct and keep babies safe.
While deterrence and retribution were likely both argued at trial in
these two cases, the critical facts of Grimshaw and Evenflo indicate how
juries can be more persuaded toward one of the twin goals of punitive damages when determining the proper amount of a punitive award. Consequently, because a jury award does not precisely allocate the amounts to
deterrence and retribution, the final punitive damages award necessarily
conflates the twin goals.

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

217 P.3d 514, 518–519 (Mont. 2009).
Id. at 518.
Id. at 517.
Id. at 518.
Id.
Id.
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The American civil system provides various ways for punitive damages awards to be assessed and reviewed. Bifurcation is used in numerous
jurisdictions to separate the determination of punitive damages from the
liability portion of trial.58 However, following Campbell, in all jurisdictions
the judge must review the jury’s punitive award after trial for constitutional
due process violations.59 On top of bifurcation and post-verdict review, the
judge must also abide by state statutes limiting a punitive damages award,
which varies substantially from state to state.60 Ultimately, this leaves a
plaintiff at the complete mercy of a particular court on how it copes with
large punitive awards in post-verdict review.
A. Bifurcation
Bifurcation of the liability phase and punitive phase of a trial helps
ensure a jury determines liability first, without unduly prejudicing a defendant by introducing its financial status.61 Many states have adopted bifurcation.62 Bifurcation is also mandatory upon request of either party in these
jurisdictions.63
Montana requires bifurcated trials.64 Montana Code Annotated
§ 27–1–221(7)(a) describes the nature of the bificurated jury trial when punitive damages are determined. In the first trial, when the jury decides
whether a defendant is guilty of the claims against him, the jury also determines whether the defendant is liable for punitive damages.65 Then, if the
jury determines that the defendant is liable for punitives, the bifurcated punitive damages proceeding immediately follows the first trial.66 During the
second proceeding, the plaintiffs may present evidence on the defendant’s
58. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15–5.13 (2015); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15–32–520 (2015); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.21 (West 2015); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27–1–221(7) (2015); W. VA. CODE
§ 55–7–29 (2015); MO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.263 (2015).
59. Lindsay J. Efting, Punitive Damages: Will the Courts Still Punish the Wrongdoer After State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, 49 S.D. L. REV. 67, 102 (2003).
60. See generally BMW, 517 U.S. at 614–619 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (listing state statutes limiting punitive damages awards).
61. Harkin, supra note 43, at 374.
62. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15–5.13 (2015); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15–32–520 (2015); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.21 (West 2015); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27–1–221(7) (2015); W. VA. CODE
§ 55–7–29 (2015); MO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.263 (2015).
63. Id.
64. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27–1–221(7)(a).
65. Id.
66. Id.
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net worth and finances, and the jury considers that net worth when determining the punitive award.67
Bifurcation is an important solution to take money out of the equation
during the trial’s liability phase. Remember, punitive damages cannot be
awarded in the absence of liability and compensatory damages. In the first
phase, juries can determine whether the defendant is liable for the harm
caused based solely on the facts underlying the injury at issue. Not only
does the process allow for a more just decision on liability, it furthers the
“twin goals” of punitive damages. When the defendant’s net worth is admitted in the second phase, the jury is allowed to determine both the appropriate amount the defendant can handle and the best amount that would actually punish the defendant enough to deter the conduct and serve as a retributive sanction. Bifurcation also helps a court separate the standards of proof
for liability and punitive damages. In Montana, liability for compensatory
damages requires a preponderance of the evidence (at least 51% of the evidence), while liability for punitive damages requires clear and convincing
evidence (substantially more probable than not).68 Most states also follow
this standard of proof.69
There are a few unresolved issues with bifurcation. Among these are
the effect on the size of punitive awards, juror selection due to bifurcation,
and “juror recognition of and reaction to the contingent ‘blindfolding’ they
experienced when important aspects of the case were kept from them until
they made preliminary decisions.”70 Commentators on these issues focus on
the narrowing of the jury’s role in the process and how bifurcation inevitably asks jurors “to resolve narrow questions of fact without ever considering the broader issues of law and policy underlying the dispute.”71 Furthermore, according to an early empirical assessment of bifurcation, bifurcation
likely reduces average trial length and favors defendants because it increases the likelihood of defense verdicts.72

67. Id.
68. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 27–1–202, 27–1–221(5); see also Lawrence v. Westlake, 73 P. 119, 120
(Mont. 1903) (“[I]n civil cases the affirmative of the issue must be proved, and when the evidence is
contradictory the decision must be made according to the preponderance of the evidence.”).
69. The only states that require only a preponderance of evidence for liability of punitive damages
are: Connecticut, Illinois, Louisiana, Massachusetts, New Mexico, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia.
Colorado requires evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. Wyoming has no clear standard of proof.
70. Stephan Landsman et. al, Be Careful What You Wish for: The Paradoxical Effects of Bifurcating Claims for Punitive Damages, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 297, 301 (1998). These issues with bifurcation
are beyond the scope of this paper and will not be addressed further.
71. Id. at 300.
72. Hans Zeisel & Thomas Callahan, Split Trials and Time Saving: A Statistical Analysis, 76 HARV.
L. REV. 1606, 1610–1612 (1963).
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B. Post-verdict review
Ever since Campbell, trial courts are required to review the jury’s verdict. This is referred to as the “post-verdict review” stage and both parties
are allowed to submit briefing in support of or opposition to the jury’s punitive damages verdict.73 As stated in Campbell, a court’s task in reviewing
the constitutionality of a punitive damages award is to identify the “outermost limit of the due process guarantee,” not to choose a number the court
regards as suitable given the facts of the case.74 However, besides looking
at the Supreme Court’s factors of reasonableness under Gore, a court must
also examine the particular state’s statutes for guidance on post-trial review.
The result is a two-step process: first, determine whether the award is consistent with state law; and second, determine whether it violates due process, as analyzed by the United States Supreme Court in Gore and Campbell.
In Montana, when a court weighs a punitive damages award, Montana
Code sets forth the factors the judge is to use:
(i) the nature and reprehensibility of the defendant’s wrongdoing;
(ii) the extent of the defendant’s wrongdoing;
(iii) the intent of the defendant in committing the wrong;
(iv) the profitability of the defendant’s wrongdoing, if applicable;
(v) the amount of actual damages awarded by the jury;
(vi) the defendant’s net worth;
(vii) previous awards of punitive or exemplary damages against the defendant based upon the same wrongful act;
(viii) potential or prior criminal sanctions against the defendant based upon
the same wrongful act; and
(ix) any other circumstances that may operate to increase or reduce, without
wholly defeating, punitive damages.75

The statute allows for an increase or decrease in the amount of punitive
damages, but does not allow for the reversal of the jury’s finding on liability for punitive damages.76 A court must clearly state the reasons for altering a jury’s punitive award by analyzing the factors.77 A district court’s
discretion to increase or decrease an award of punitive damages should be
consistent with the findings implicit in the jury’s verdict.78 Finally, the
73.
duction
(1995).
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Sandra L. Nunn, The Due Process Ramifications of Punitive Damages, Continued: TXO ProCorp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2711 (1993), 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 1029, 1053
Campbell, 538 U.S. at 425.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 27–1–221(7)(b).
See DeBruycker v. Guar. Nat. Ins. Co., 880 P.2d 819, 822 (Mont. 1994).
MONT. CODE ANN. § 27–1–221(7)(b).
Marie Deonier & Assocs. v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 101 P.3d 742, 749 (Mont. 2004).
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amount of the jury’s verdict should be affirmed if it is supported by substantial evidence.79
1. Ratio-balancing test
When post-trial review occurs, the Campbell ratio-balancing test lingers in the background. Under the ratio-balancing test, no compensatory
damages award to punitive damages award should be higher than 1:9, respectively. Applying the Campbell test falls within the court’s discretion
during post-trial review of punitive damages. But, since the Campbell decision in 2003, most courts agree that this single-digit test is not the brightline rule.80 A double-digit punitive damages multiplier is appropriate in
cases of serious physical harm or in cases where malice aforethought is
pervasive.81 Thus, even when the harm incurred leads to low compensatory
damages, if the harm caused is not sufficiently penalized, the defendant will
lack motivation to take remedial measures to protect other victims.
The Montana Supreme Court has rejected this single-digit ratio approach. In Marie Deonier & Associates v. Paul Revere Life Insurance
Co.,82 a 2004 case issued after Campbell, the Montana Supreme Court
stated: “We have consistently rejected the notion that the constitutional line
is marked by a simple mathematical formula, even one that compares actual
and potential damages to the punitive award.”83 Yet, in Seltzer v. Morton,84
the Montana Supreme Court held that the highest single-digit multiplier was
proper in a case involving non-physical harm, in absence of evidence that
the misconduct was driven by significant profit motive, and in a situation
where the wrongdoing was the result of an isolated incident.85 However, the
court expressly allowed for larger punitive damages awards as long as the
defendant did “not have a history of this kind of misconduct and its conduct
was not driven by any significant profit motive” and agreed that in these
instances “a double-digit multiplier would undoubtedly comport with due
process.”86
79. Cartwright v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U.S., 914 P.2d 976, 993 (Mont. 1996); Deonier, 101
P.3d at 749.
80. See, e.g., Estate of Schwarz ex rel. Schwarz v. Philip Morris Inc., 235 P.3d 668, 672, 677 (Or.
2010), adhered to on reconsideration, 246 P.3d 479 (Or. 2010) (ratio of 148:1); White v. Ford Motor
Co., 500 F.3d 963, 971–974 (9th Cir. 2007) (ratio of 23:1); Mathias v. Accor Econ. Lodging, Inc., 347
F.3d 672, 676 (7th Cir. 2003) (ratio of 74:1); Swinton v. Potomac Corp., 270 F.3d 794, 818–819 (9th
Cir.2001) (28:1).
81. Gore, 517 U.S. at 582.
82. 101 P.3d 742, 749 (Mont. 2004) (quoting Gore, 517 U.S. at 582 (emphasis omitted)).
83. Id. (borrowing the language directly from the United States Supreme Court in Gore, 517 U.S. at
582).
84. 154 P.3d 561 (Mont. 2007).
85. Id. at 614.
86. Id.
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In summary, if the defendant’s conduct was extremely reprehensible,
occurred multiple times, or was driven primarily by a profit motive, a high
punitive damages award will likely be upheld. As stated best by the Seventh
Circuit, “The judicial function is to police a range not a point.”87 Clearly,
that range is subject to variation depending on the facts of each case.
2. State limits on punitive damages awards88
Many states have enacted legislation imposing limits on the magnitude
of punitive damages awards.89 Some states agree that reviewing a defendant’s wealth is appropriate when determining the value of punitive damages.90 But, states and attorneys disagree about the relevance of the wealth
of the defendant in determining a punitive award.91 Regardless of whether
the defendant’s wealth is admissible or relevant to the award’s deterrence
and retribution objectives, states have backed away from the defendant’s
wealth being the sole factor of the reasonableness of the award. Instead, a
growing number of jurisdictions have enacted statutory limitations on the
amount of the award. These monetary restrictions consist of eight different
approaches toward limiting, or not limiting, punitive damages: (1) capping
at a multiple of compensatory damages or a specified amount, whichever is
greater; (2) capping at only a multiple of compensatory damages; (3) capping at some specified amount; (4) distinguishing between non-physical and
physical harm; (5) capping based on the defendant’s finances and/or net
worth and a specified amount; (6) diverting a portion of the punitive dam87. Mathias v. Accor Econ. Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672, 678 (7th Cir. 2003) (analyzing Gore and
TXO).
88. This section only discusses statutory caps or other limitations on the amount of punitive
damages that may be awarded and does not include particular circumstances that various states restrict
punitive damages. See Appendix 1. This is an alphabetical state-by-state table of punitive damages
limitations.
89. See infra Appendix 1.
90. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 21–22 (concluding that the financial position of the defendant is one factor
that could be taken into account in assessing punitive damages); Eichenseer v. Reserve Life Ins. Co.,
934 F.2d 1377, 1384 (5th Cir. 1991) (“The corporate size of [defendant] is another factor that supports
the award of punitive damages against it.”); see also infra Appendix 1.
91. Compare Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Historical Continuity of Punitive Damages
Awards: Reforming the Tort Reformers, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1269, 1317–1318 (1993) (endorsing the
scaling of punitive damages to defendants’ wealth because larger sanctions are required to influence the
rich than the poor), with Kenneth S. Abraham & John C. Jeffries, Jr., Punitive Damages and the Rule of
Law: The Role of Defendant’s Wealth, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 415, 415 (1989) (concluding that a “defendant’s wealth is irrelevant to the goal of deterring socially undesirable conduct and is an improper
consideration in assessing the basis for retribution”), and Clarence Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort
Cases, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1191 (1931) (noting that evidence of a defendant’s wealth, “instead of
aiding the jury to assess a proper verdict, may prejudice them against the defendant and prevent an
impartial judgment”).
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ages to a state fund; (7) no punitive damages cap; and (8) completely abolishing punitive damages.92
C. Where does Montana’s punitive damages statute fall?
Montana allowed for punitive damages starting in 1987 “for the sake
of example and for the purpose of punishing a defendant.”93 The statute
disallows punitives in contract or breach of contract cases and for claims
against the State.94 However, it expressly states that punitives are allowed
in products liability cases, whether or not part of a contract.95 Punitive damages are also recoverable in employment discrimination actions, environmental liability claims, insurer’s bad faith claims, and professional liability
actions.96
In Montana, reasonable punitive damages may be awarded when the
defendant has been found liable for actual fraud or actual malice.97 All elements of a claim for punitive damages must be proved by clear and convincing evidence, meaning there is no serious or substantial doubt about the
correctness of the conclusions drawn from the evidence.98 At trial, liability
for punitive damages is to be determined by the trier of fact, whether judge
or jury.99 Furthermore, as stated above, evidence of a defendant’s financial
affairs, financial condition, and net worth are admitted only during the second proceeding immediately following the trial if the trier of fact finds the
defendant liable for punitive damages.100
Montana’s statutory and common law does not mandate any relationship between compensatory and punitive damages awards. Punitive damages may be awarded even where the plaintiff is granted nominal damages
92. See infra Appendix 2. This table breaks the eight forms of limitations into categories and notes
the states that follow those approaches.
93. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27–1–220.
94. MONT. CODE ANN § 2–9–105 (2015); MONT. CODE ANN § 27–1–220(2)(a)(ii). However, the
Montana Supreme Court has allowed recovery of punitive damages in tort actions with underlying contracts, i.e., tortious interference with business relations, conversion or fraud or breach of its implied
covenant of good faith. See Daniels v. Dean, 833 P.2d 1078, 1084 (Mont. 1992); Lane v. Dunkle, 753
P.2d 321, 324 (Mont. 1988); Purcell v. Auto. Gas Distrib., Inc., 673 P.2d 1246, 1250 (Mont. 1983);
Firestone v. Oasis Telecomms., Data, & Records, Inc., 2003 WL 25960323 (Mont. Dist. 2003).
95. MONT. CODE ANN § 2–9–105; MONT. CODE ANN § 27–1–220(2)(a)(ii).
96. Owens v. Parker Drilling Co., 676 P.2d 162, 163, 165 (Mont. 1984); Ferguson v. Town Pump,
580 P.2d 915, 921 (Mont. 1978), overruled on other grounds by Bohrer v. Clark, 590 P.2d 117 (Mont.
1978); Bostwick v. Foremost Ins. Co., 539 F. Supp. 517, 520 (D. Mont. 1982); Gibson v. W. Fire Ins.
Co., 682 P.2d 725, 731 (Mont. 1984); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27–1–221.
97. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27–1–221; Crystal Springs Trout Co. v. First State Bank of Froid, 732
P.2d 819, 827 (Mont. 1987); see also Kiefer v. McCafferty, No. 78478, 1994 LEXIS 611, at *8–9
(Mont. Dist. March 15, 1994).
98. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27–1–221(5); Cartwright, 914 P.2d at 976.
99. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27–1–221(6).
100. Id. § 27–1–221(7)(a).
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or where no value has been assigned to the actual damages.101 Without a
finding of actual damages, however, exemplary damages are improper in
Montana.102 Finally, all punitive damages are payable to the plaintiff.103
Montana limits the amount of punitive damages in any non-class action claim to $10 million or 3% of a defendant’s net worth, whichever is
less.104 Montana is one of four states to limit an award based on the defendant’s net worth.105 Kansas does not base its limitation on the entire net
worth of the defendant per se, but instead limits the award to the lesser of
the highest annual gross income earned within the preceding five years, or
$5 million.106 However, the statute further reads that:
if the court finds that the profitability of the defendant’s misconduct exceeds
or is expected to exceed the limitation [of highest gross income over five
years or $5 million], the limitation on the amount of exemplary or punitive
damages which the court may award shall be an amount equal to one and a
half times the amount of profit which the defendant gained or is expected to
gain as a result of the defendant’s misconduct.107

Thus, unlike Montana, there is a caveat in Kansas’s limitation for courts to
go beyond the statutory cap and allow for punitives in wake of a defendant’s profitability from her conduct.
On the other hand, Mississippi takes into consideration the entire net
worth of the defendant and then caps at a monetary amount depending on
the defendant’s financial situation.108 Mississippi’s scheme seems very particular but, in reality, simply limits the award to about 2% of a defendant’s
net worth. Remarkably, the way the statute is written, if a defendant falls
under the same subsection category, defendants with a larger net worth ac101. Weinberg v. Farmers St. Bank of Warden, 752 P.2d 719, 732 (Mont. 1988).
102. Doll v. Major Muffler Ctrs., Inc., 687 P.2d 48, 55 (Mont. 1984).
103. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27–1–221. There is no statute in Montana that diverts a portion of the
plaintiff’s total punitive damages award to the State or another entity.
104. Id. § 27–1–220(3).
105. See infra Appendix 2.
106. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60–3701(e).
107. Id. § 60–3701(f).
108. MISS. CODE ANN. § 11–1–65(3)(a) (“In any civil action where an entitlement to punitive damages shall have been established under applicable laws, no award of punitive damages shall exceed the
following: (i) Twenty Million Dollars ($20,000,000.00) for a defendant with a net worth of more than
One Billion Dollars ($1,000,000,000.00); (ii) Fifteen Million Dollars ($15,000,000.00) for a defendant
with a net worth of more than Seven Hundred Fifty Million Dollars ($750,000,000.00) but not more than
One Billion Dollars ($1,000,000,000.00); (iii) Five Million Dollars ($5,000,000.00) for a defendant with
a net worth of more than Five Hundred Million Dollars ($500,000,000.00) but not more than Seven
Hundred Fifty Million Dollars ($750,000,000.00); (iv) Three Million Seven Hundred Fifty Thousand
Dollars ($3,750,000.00) for a defendant with a net worth of more than One Hundred Million Dollars
($100,000,000.00) but not more than Five Hundred Million Dollars ($500,000,000.00); (v) Two Million
Five Hundred Thousand Dollars ($2,500,000.00) for a defendant with a net worth of more than Fifty
Million Dollars ($50,000,000.00) but not more than One Hundred Million Dollars ($100,000,000. 00);
or (vi) Two percent (2%) of the defendant’s net worth for a defendant with a net worth of Fifty Million
Dollars ($50,000,000.00) or less.”).
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tually are capped at a lower percentage of their net worth compared to those
defendants with a lower net worth. For example, under Mississippi Code
Annotated § 11–1–65(3)(ii), a company worth $750 million is limited to an
award of $15 million, or is at risk of 2% of its net worth. However, any
company above $750 million in net worth up to $1 billion is also limited to
$15 million, which puts it at risk below 2%.109 This scheme is quite flawed
in this respect.
Finally, Alabama carves out a limitation for punitive awards against
small businesses.110 For any small business with a net worth less than $2
million, Alabama caps the award at $50,000 or 10% of the small business’s
net worth, whichever is less.111 Mathematically speaking, this means that
any small business with a net worth of $500,000 to $2 million would only
be liable for punitives up to $50,000, and any business with $500,000 or
less in net worth would be liable up to 10% of its total net worth. These
calculations show that the defendant’s net worth does not play a factor unless it is a very small business—below $500,000 in net worth.
All three of these states’ punitive damages limitations are arbitrary.
The statutes only place subjective monetary caps on punitive awards based
off a defendant’s net worth. Montana is particularly capricious in this respect because it places all defendants in the same scheme, no matter what
their net worth may be. Montana’s punitive limitation lies somewhere between Kansas’s and Mississippi’s caps. The $10 million serves as a strict
monetary cap and the defendant’s net worth is taken into consideration if
3% of the defendant’s net worth is below $10 million. As the statute reads,
it is the lesser of the two amounts. So, if a large corporation is sued in
Montana state court and becomes liable for punitive damages, $10 million
may be a drop-in-the-bucket if the company is worth over $333 million.112
While multi-million dollar corporations may not be the usual defendants
sued in Montana and subject to the Montana punitive damages cap, the
statute still mandates a subjective cap that is economically inefficient based
on the net worth of the defendant.
109. For example, if a defendant’s net worth is $750 million and is limited to a $15 million punitive
damage award, it is at risk 2%. However, a defendant with a net worth of $950 million falls under the
same category and is also subject to the $15 million cap, which puts that company at risk only 1.58%.
While the difference between 2% and 1.57% seems miniscule, it is a difference of millions of dollars for
a multi-million dollar company.
110. ALA. CODE § 6–11–21(b)-(c) (2016).
111. Id.
112. By solving for $10 million to be exactly 3% of a defendant’s net worth, one reaches the solution
of $333,333,333.33.
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In Montana, there is no constitutional right to punitive damages, and as
such, the legislature has plenary power over punitive damages.113 The legislature has allowed limited punitive damages.114 The arbitrary cut-off of $10
million dollars is an inconsequential penalty for large net-worth defendants
and serves no meaningful deterrent or retributive effect. To combat this
problem, Montana practitioners have relied on arguing the unconstitutionality of the statute under the right to a jury trial, the right to equal protection
of the laws, and substantive due process.
A. The cap violates the right to trial by jury
First, one can argue the statutory cap violates the Montana Constitution’s right to a jury trial, a right which must remain “inviolate.” Montana’s
punitive damages cap of $10 million per defendant conflicts with Montana’s Constitution because its application undermines the original trial by
jury the framers deemed fundamental. Article II, Section 26, of the Montana Constitution provides that “[t]he right of trial by jury is secured to all
and shall remain inviolate.”115 The Montana Constitution guarantees that
right “in the class of cases in which the right was enjoyed when the constitution was adopted.”116 Punitive damages are a component of the civil action and within the purview of Article II, Section 26.117 The legislature
recognized this by requiring that punitive damages be determined by “the
trier of fact.”118
As Montana Supreme Court Justice Nelson observed, the “constitutionally guaranteed right of a jury trial is ‘fundamental’ and, therefore, deserving of the highest level of court scrutiny and protection.”119 When a
legislative act interferes with a fundamental right, courts must apply strict
scrutiny, the most stringent standard.120 Strict scrutiny requires that legisla113. Meech v. Hillhaven W., 776 P.2d 488, 493–495, 500 (Mont. 1989).
114. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27–1–220.
115. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 26.
116. Matter of C.L.A., 685 P.2d 931, 933 (Mont. 1984).
117. Finstad v. W.R. Grace, 8 P.3d 778, 781 (Mont. 2000) (holding “the portion of § 27–1–221(6),
MCA, requiring an award of punitive damages to be unanimous as to liability and amount directly
conflicts with Article II, Section 26 of the Montana Constitution.”).
118. MONT. CODE. ANN. § 27–1–221(6).
119. Kloss v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 54 P.3d 1, 12 (Mont. 2002) (Nelson, J., concurring) (citations
omitted); Assoc. Press Inc. v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 4 P.3d 5, 15 (Mont. 2000) (“In the words of the
framers, Article II of the Constitution, contains the ‘fundamental principles and rights guaranteed to the
people by their government.’ ”) (citing 2 MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION VERBATIM TRANSCRIPT 579 (1979) [hereinafter 2 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION TRANSCRIPT] ).
120. Gulbrandson v. Carey, 901 P.2d 573, 579 (Mont. 1995).
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tive acts intruding upon fundamental rights must be supported by a compelling state interest that is narrowly tailored to effectuate only that compelling
state interest.121 It must also be shown that “the choice of legislative action
is the least onerous path that can be taken to achieve the state objective.”122
The jury is in the best position to determine the proper amount of punitive damages because it has objectively heard all the evidence at trial. The
framers of the Montana Constitution also believed trial by jury was so important it “shall remain inviolate.”123 Today, trial by jury is still as important and each plaintiff has the constitutional right to the punitive damages
award the jury deems appropriate. The Montana statutory cap usurps the
jury’s duty to assess damages appropriate to punish and deter egregious
conduct.
B. The cap violates equal protection
Second, one could argue that the punitive damages cap violates Montana’s constitutional equal protection guarantee. Article II, Section 4, of the
Montana Constitution provides:
The dignity of the human being is inviolable. No person shall be denied the
equal protection of the laws. Further, neither the state nor any person, firm,
corporation, or institution shall discriminate against any person in the exercise
of his civil or political rights on account of race, color, sex, culture, social
origin or condition, or political or religious ideas.

There are three levels of scrutiny that courts must use under the Montana
Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause: strict scrutiny, middle-tier scrutiny,
and the rational basis test.124 The punitive damages cap fails under strict
scrutiny, which inevitably means it fails all of the tests.
The punitive damages cap improperly classifies plaintiffs into favored
and disfavored classes. Pursuant to Montana Code Annotated
§ 27–1–220(3), the favored class consists of class action plaintiffs. The statute provides “[t]his subsection does not limit punitive damages that may be
awarded in class action lawsuits.”125 The disfavored class consists of plaintiffs who seek damages individually. Similarly, § 27–1–220(3) also arbitrarily creates a favored class of plaintiffs who sue less wealthy defendants.
These plaintiffs can achieve punishment and deterrence through a $10 million punitive damages verdict. The disfavored class of plaintiffs who sue
vastly wealthy defendants can never achieve punishment and deterrence if
the $10 million cap on punitive damages is applied. Consequently, juries
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Mont. Envtl. Info. Ctr. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 988 P.2d 1236, 1245 (Mont. 1999).
Id.
MONT. CONST. art. II, § 26.
Snetsinger v. Mont. Univ. Sys., 104 P.3d 445, 449–450 (Mont. 2004).
MONT. CODE ANN. § 27–1–220(3).
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cannot achieve punishment and deterrence against major corporations and
companies with billions of dollars.
The $10 million cap fails under strict scrutiny because there is no narrowly tailored, compelling state interest that justifies treating individual
plaintiffs differently from class plaintiffs. Nor is there any compelling state
interest that justifies treating plaintiffs who sue wealthy defendants differently from plaintiffs who sue companies that would be punished and deterred by a $10 million punitive damages verdict. Application of the cap
here precisely shows how unreasonable the distinction is—the $10 million
cap only benefits and protects major corporations. While local Montana
companies are subject to pay 3% of their net worth in punitive damages,
massive corporations would pay a much lower percent.
The $10 million cap further fails under middle-tier scrutiny. Middletier scrutiny is used in limited situations and “requires the state to demonstrate that its classification is reasonable and that its interest in the classification is greater than that of the individual’s interest in the right infringed.”126 The punitive damages cap fails under middle-tier scrutiny because it is unreasonable to apply the arbitrary $10 million cap on punitive
damages to individual plaintiffs but not to class plaintiffs. It is unreasonable
that plaintiffs who sue defendants with vast wealth are arbitrarily precluded
from punishing and deterring wrongdoers, whereas a plaintiff who sues a
less wealthy defendant is not similarly precluded. The State has no interest
in classifying plaintiffs on the basis of arbitrary distinctions (i.e. class action
plaintiffs) and that distinction is in no way more important than the fundamental reason for punitive damages—a plaintiff’s right to punish and deter
wrongdoers.127
Furthermore, the statute capping punitive damages at $10 million is
not rationally related to a governmental interest. “The rational basis test
requires the government to show (1) that the statute’s objective was legitimate, and (2) that the statute’s objective bears a rational relationship to the
classification used by the legislature.”128 “Stated another way, the statute
must bear a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental interest.”129
The Montana Supreme Court has repeatedly used the rational basis test
to strike down laws creating arbitrary classifications without a legitimate
126. Davis v. Union P. R. Co., 937 P.2d 27, 31–32 (Mont. 1997).
127. Understandably, the state’s interest in classifying class action plaintiffs differently is likely
judicial efficiency. However, if the class action claim is still against one defendant, that defendant
should still be accountable for the same amount of punitive damages as any other defendant not under a
class action lawsuit.
128. Henry v. State Comp. Ins. Fund, 982 P.2d 456, 462 (Mont. 1999).
129. Id.
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state interest.130 When applying the rational basis test, it is important to note
cost-control alone cannot justify discrimination.131 Furthermore, a statute
cannot pass the rational basis test when it creates arbitrary classes on the
sole mechanism a claimant has to enforce the legislature’s stated goal.132
C. The cap violates substantive due process
Attorneys further argue the punitive damages statutory cap violates the
substantive due process clause of the Montana Constitution. “The theory
underlying substantive due process reaffirms the fundamental concept that
the due process clause contains a substantive component which bars arbitrary governmental actions regardless of the procedures used to implement
them, and serves as a check on oppressive governmental action.”133 Applying the one-size-fits-all $10 million cap on punitive damages is arbitrary,
capricious, and not rationally related to the stated objective of punitive
damages. Montana statute provides that punitive damages are “for the sake
of example and for the purpose of punishing a defendant” and “must be
determined by the trier of fact.”134 By applying the cap, however, the legislature would effectively strip the jury of its ability to set an example of and
punish defendants appropriately, depending on the size of the defendant.
That is the entire reason a defendant’s financial status is admissible in the
bifurcated trial.
D. District Court Opinions Have Declared Montana’s Punitive
Damages Limits Unconstitutional
In 2014, Montana’s Second Judicial District Court ruled the punitive
damages cap unconstitutional. In Masters Group International, Inc. v.
Comerica Bank,135 a Michigan bank and a Delaware furniture and equipment manufacturer disputed a contract that facilitated the purchase of an
130. See, e.g., Davis v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 937 P.2d 27, 34 (Mont. 1997) (“There is no rational basis for treating tort victims injured by nonresident corporate tort-feasors differently than tort victims
injured by all other nonresident tort-feasors.”); Henry, 982 P.2d at 460 (“In sum, we can see no rational
basis for treating workers who are injured over one work shift differently from workers who are injured
over two work shifts.”); Oberson v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 171 P.3d 715 (Mont. 2007) (holding a statute
relieving snowmobile area operators of certain forms of liability unconstitutional); Brewer v. Ski-Lift
Inc., 762 P.2d 226, 230 (Mont. 1988) (holding a series of statutes purportedly intended to protect ski
area operators from liability arising form risks allegedly “inherent” in the sport were “needlessly over
broad” because they went “far beyond the stated purposes of the statutes”).
131. Heisler v. Hines Motor Co., 937 P.2d 45, 52 (Mont. 1997) (“Heisler argues that cost-control alone cannot justify discrimination. We agree.”).
132. See Henry, 982 P.2d at 463.
133. Newville v. Dep’t of Fam. Servs., 883 P.2d 793, 799 (Mont. 1994).
134. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27–1–220(1); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27–1–221(6).
135. 352 P.3d 1101, 1104–1109 (Mont. 2015).
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office products business and established its headquarters in Butte, Montana.136 The two initiated the high-stakes contract—a forbearance agreement—during the American economic crisis.137 Even though the defendant,
Comerica, received Troubled Asset Relief Program funds from the federal
government, none of the funds reached Masters, and it defaulted on the
loan.138 Applying Montana law, the jury awarded $5.4 million for wrongful
offset, $20 million for lost future profits, $16.5 million for other consequential damages, and $10.5 million in punitive damages.139 In the postverdict review of the punitive damages award, the district court held the
punitive damages statute unconstitutional and upheld the punitive damages
award.140 On July 1, 2015, the Montana Supreme Court issued an order on
the case, but, due to the choice-of-law conflict, remanded the case back to
the district court to apply Michigan law and, thus, did not offer an opinion
on the constitutionality of Montana’s punitive damages cap.141
A few months later in the Montana Twentieth Judicial District Court,
in Olson v. Hyundai Motor Co.,142a jury held the defendants, Hyundai Motor Company and Hyundai Motor America, liable for killing two teenagers
due to a defective steering knuckle that failed while driving on a Montana
highway. Evidence showed Hyundai chose to place profit ahead of safety
when it did not address the previous Hyundai customer complaints indicating similar knuckle issues with Hyundai vehicles.143 Instead of recalling
approximately 5 million cars to replace the knuckles, which would have
likely cost over a billion dollars, Hyundai decided to do nothing and, in
turn, put society at risk.144 At trial, the jury awarded a total of $8.1 million
in compensatory damages and $240 million in punitive damages against
Hyundai—a ratio of 1:29.6.145 After the trial, the district court reviewed the
award pursuant to § 27–1–221(7) and declined to reduce the award to the
statutory cap of $10 million.146 Instead, based on the fact Hyundai had over
$46 billion in net worth, and interpreting the degree of reprehensibility of
the defendant’s conduct, the court concluded that only the highest single136. Masters Grp Int’l., 352 P.3d at 1105.
137. Id. at 1107–1108.
138. Id. at 1109.
139. Id.
140. Comerica Bank v. Mont. Second Jud. Dist. Ct., No. DV 2011-372, 2014 WL 2895577 (Mont.
Dec. 30, 2013).
141. Masters Grp. Int’l, 352 P.3d at 1118–1119.
142. Order on Plaintiffs’ Joint Motion for Review of Punitive Damages and Entry of Judgment,
Olson v. Hyundai Motor Co., No. DV 11-304, 2014 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 35, at *2–9 (Mont. Dist. Ct.
Sept. 19, 2014).
143. Entry of Judgment, supra note 163, at *24.
144. Id.
145. Id. at *24–25.
146. Id. at *35–39.
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digit multiplier would be appropriate.147 This amounted to a reduction of
the punitive damages award from $240 million to $72 million—a ratio of
1:9, compensatory damages to punitive damages.148 Furthermore, the court
declared the Montana cap on punitive damages unconstitutional because it
violated the guaranteed right to trial by jury, the right to equal protection,
the right to due process of the law, and the judge further explained that the
$10 million limit did not serve the purposes of punishment and deterrence.149
About one year later, in Kelly Logging, Inc. v. First Interstate Bank,150
the Montana Fourth Judicial District Court upheld a jury verdict with a 1:58
ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages and again declared the
Montana punitive damages cap unconstitutional. In this case, Kelly Logging
claimed First Interstate took $762,000 out of its checking account to pay off
a note that was current, was not due, and had not matured.151 The jury
found First Interstate liable for all the claims against it and awarded $16.7
million in punitive damages for misconduct and $290,000 in compensatory
damages.152 The court reiterated that the “single digit test” was not a brightline rule and believed the jury accurately considered First Interstate’s $838
million net worth by awarding only 2% in punitives. In terms of constitutionality, the court held the punitive damages cap unconstitutional because
it violated the right to trial by jury, the right to equal protection, and substantive due process.153
V.

USING ECONOMICS TO CREATE EFFICIENT
PUNITIVE DAMAGES AWARDS

The issue with relying on arguments regarding the constitutionality of
Montana’s punitive damages statute is that even if the Montana Supreme
Court found the statute unconstitutional, it would leave a void for an actual
solution to the problem. Consequently, the determination of an appropriate
punitive damages award would revert back to post-verdict review. Under
the United States Supreme Court’s constitutional standards discussed
above, a lower court must ask itself a multitude of questions to determine
the constitutionality of a punitive award: Does the punitive damages verdict
147. Id. at *28–33.
148. Id. at *31.
149. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 4; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 17; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 26; Entry of
Judgment, supra note 163, at *31–38.
150. Kelly Logging, Inc. v. First Interstate Bank, 2015 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 82, at *14, 36–37 (Mont.
Dist. Ct. April 21, 2015) (awarding punitive damages at 2% of First Interstate’s $838,000,000 net
worth).
151. Id. at *6.
152. Id. at *1–2.
153. Id. at *9–10, 24, 36–38.
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achieve the goals of deterrence and retribution? Is the award grossly excessive? How reprehensible was the defendant’s conduct? Is the award fundamentally fair and reasonable with the facts of the case? This is no simple
task for a trial court and the process misallocates scarce judicial resources.
Since juries have already taken the facts under consideration and determined a punitive damages award, the post-verdict stage is merely repeating
the same process from a court’s standpoint. This current constitutional doctrine governing punitive damages is flawed and undermines one of the critical twin goals of punitive damages by preventing courts from achieving
optimal deterrence.
An economic analysis of a punitive damages award can create an economically efficient level of punitive damages in an amount which forces a
defendant to fully internalize the cost of the harm it imposes on society.154
At the very least, an economic solution serves to address the deterrence
objective of punitive damages.155 Under this doctrine, “injurers [should be]
made to pay for the harm their conduct generates, not less, not more.”156
Therefore, when punitive damages are assessed, defendants should bear all
the costs of their decisions.157 Without an addition to compensatory damages, defendants will often not take enough care to prevent causing harm in
the first place.158 This is because the cost of their actions is borne by third
parties instead of the defendant. Economists call these third-party effects
externalities.159 If defendants do not internalize the cost of their potential
harm imposed onto society, negative externalities result. This is often called
a “spill over” effect, where a defendant’s harm injures third parties that are
not associated with the economic actor’s decision process.160 Ensuring that
the defendant internalizes these negative externalities is how the economic
theory of deterrence creates an economically efficient punitive damages
award.
The basic economic theory for optimal deterrence originates from welfare economics: a branch of economics that uses microeconomic techniques
to evaluate well-being and also establishes guidelines for social policy aiming at the maximization of utility at the aggregate level.161 The “utility” is
154. Benjamin J. McMichael, Constitutional Limitations on Punitive Damages: Ambiguous Effects
and Inconsistent Justifications, 66 VAND. L. REV. 961, 969 (2013).
155. For purposes of this paper, the author’s contribution regarding the economic theory of deterrence focuses solely on deterrence. Retribution is not implicated by the economic solution based upon
the inability to quantify punishment from defendant to defendant.
156. Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 39, at 873.
157. HENRY N. BUTLER, CHRISTOPHER R. DRAHOZAL & JOANNA SHEPHERD, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
FOR LAWYERS 185 (3d ed. 2014).
158. McMichael, supra note 154, at 969.
159. BUTLER, DRAHOZAL & SHEPHERD, supra note 157, at 185.
160. Id.
161. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARIES, available at https://perma.cc/XT63-D775.

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 2016

23

Montana Law Review, Vol. 77 [2016], Iss. 2, Art. 4
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\77-2\MON202.txt

350

unknown

Seq: 24

MONTANA LAW REVIEW

30-AUG-16

13:42

Vol. 77

the net well-being of an individual. Under welfare economics, the evaluation of society’s utility consists of two elements: first, the determination of
the utility of each individual; and second, the amalgamation of each individual’s utility.162 The “amalgamation” is the combination of all individual
utilities to determine an optimal social utility. Thus, using welfare economics to assess punitive damages awards is appropriate because it organizes
the inquiry around how rational defendants will respond to the threat of
punitive damages and whether their responses will help or hinder social
welfare.163
Basic economic theory defines the optimal level of care as that at
which the marginal cost of any additional care is equal to the benefit that
care will provide.164 Under a punitive damages perspective, the private marginal cost (PMC) is the cost of producing the conduct, product, or design
borne by the defendant. The social marginal cost (SMC) is the harm induced onto society from the defendant placing its product into society. The
marginal benefit (MB) is the social benefit derived from the product being
available in the market.
The purpose of punitive damages is to provide a sufficient threat to
make the private marginal cost equal to both the social marginal cost and
the marginal benefit (PMC=SMC=MB).165 The care here is the care needed
by the defendant to prevent the harm. Optimizing this level of care is efficient because any additional care forces society to incur more costs than the
savings that would result from that care.166 The problem with this basic
economic theory is that, in a punitive damages scenario, a defendant is confronted with a situation where its private marginal cost is much lower than
the societal marginal cost. Assuming that the compensatory damages of a
plaintiff always equal the social marginal cost, this equation purports that
the marginal benefit would also have to equal this amount. Further, since
punitive damages are a portion of the private marginal cost of the defendant, inputting punitive damages into the private marginal cost would always result in punitives being only a fraction of the compensatory damages.
Clearly, this is not economically efficient because defendants would never
take the necessary precautions to reduce their harm onto society when their
liability of punitives would only be a fraction of their compensatory liabil162. Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, 113 YALE L.J. 347, 450–451
(2003).
163. Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 39, at 873.
164. KENNETH ARROW, THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
FACTORS 623 (1962).
165. STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 243–247 (2004) (describing
factors that are not accounted for in compensatory damages that may lead to inadequate incentives to
reduce risk).
166. Id.
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ity. Consequently, under this approach, defendants would simply account
for their cost of potential compensatory liability versus the social cost of
their behavior.
To combat this issue, legal and economic scholars have outlined a
formula that provides one solution by computing punitive awards as follows:167

Here, PD is the optimal punitive damages award, CD is the compensatory
award, and p is the probability that a court will hold the defendant liable.168
This analysis assumes that the compensatory award, or CD, perfectly represents the harm inflicted on the plaintiff, also known as the social marginal
cost. Therefore, the proper level of total damages to impose on a defendant
if she is found liable is the harm caused multiplied by the reciprocal of the
probability of being found liable. Solving for PD alone:

The subtlety of this equation explains why it is insufficient to have only a
compensatory award. Yet, this equation does not appropriately solve for
punitive damages under a welfare economics assessment. It is entirely nonsensical that the greater the probability of the defendant being liable, the
lower the punitive damages award. Assuming equal compensatory damages, this equation reasons that a defendant who is 90% likely to be held
liable pays less in punitive damages than a defendant who is only 10%
likely to be held liable. Consequently, anytime the likelihood of being held
liable exceeds 62%, the equation produces a smaller punitive damages
award than the basic economic model described above. A defendant should
not be disincentivized to enter into socially beneficial behavior the higher
its potential liability; the inverse is more accurate.
It is easier to comprehend this situation by way of an example. Say a
corporation makes cars and knows that the car has a particular design flaw
but is unsure whether to redesign the car. Additionally, the company determines that it is held liable only one quarter of the time harm is caused,
which puts the company’s probability of being found liability at 25%. If the
average harm is worth $100,000 in compensatory damages at trial, under
basic economic theory, the expected marginal cost to the company is only
167. Id.; Joni Hersch & W. Kip Viscusi, Punitive Damages: How Judges and Juries Perform, 33 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1, 3–4 (2004); McMichael, supra note 154, at 971.
168. McMichael, supra note 154, at 970–971.
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$25,000 because it is only held liable 25% of the time. Ultimately, basic
economic theory shows that the company would not invest more than
$25,000 into the safety of the car because it would rather take the risk of
paying the expected cost of $25,000 and keep inducing the harm.
To persuade the defendant to invest in favorable societal precautions,
the optimal level of care equation theorizes that a punitive award must be
added to the private marginal cost in order for defendants to internalize
their harmful cost to society.169 Here, with a 25% probability of being held
liable and an average compensatory damages award of $100,000, the optimal punitive award is calculated as follows:

Working through the equation, the optimal punitive damages award
under the economic theory of deterrence would be $300,000. This theory,
when used with various values and liability outcomes, induces many illogical ratios of compensatory damages to punitive damages. Inputting CD as a
constant of $100,000 and p at values of 2.5%, 5%, 10%, 25%, 50%, 75%,
and 90%, results in the following PD values:

169. Id. at 970.
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Therefore, as the defendant’s likelihood of being held liable for harm increases, the punitive damages amount decreases. Moreover, a 1:1 ratio will
only come about when the liability percentage is perfectly 50%, doubling
the compensatory damages amount.170 This is economically inefficient because the expected value of punitive damages does not appropriately increase as the value of p, the likelihood of being held liable (or better put, the
likelihood the defendant will be liable for its costs onto society), increases
and the resulting PD does not fit the optimum utility equation. If the punitive award decreases while the social marginal cost increases, PMC will
always be less than SMC. But, PMC should equal SMC and MB
(PMC=SMC=MB) according to basic economic theory.
There are also other issues with this economic equation. First, it does
not require the amalgamation of the individual utilities of all parties in a
given scenario. This is an amount necessary to determine the optimal level
of social utility. An efficient punitive damages award cannot be computed
without ensuring that the costs onto all of society are averaged to determine
the requisite social marginal cost. Second, with p being defined as the
probability that the defendant in a particular case will be liable, by definition, the numerator, 1 - p, is the probability that the same defendant will not
be held liable. Nowhere does this equation have a variable that accounts for
the probability that all other defendants would not be found liable, nor a
variable that a certain portion that will not be found liable. This addition to
the equation is needed to account for the negative externalities from other
defendants’ malicious conduct, which are not subject to litigation in court,
but are still placing costs onto society. An equation that addresses these
issues may lead us closer to an economically efficient solution to solve for
punitive damages in any given scenario.
VI. REALISTICALLY ACHIEVING AN OPTIMAL
PUNITIVE DAMAGES AWARD
In the event an economic solution is provided that complies with welfare economics and the optimal utility equation, the real issue is how unrealistic it is for an adjudicator, judge or jury, to apply. It is impractical to
assume that every jury trial will reveal the correct p value.171 No defendant
170. For example, if the harm is valued at $200, with a liability percentage of 50%, the equation
reveals that an optimal $200 punitive damage award equals the compensatory amount of $200.

171. Some scholars have tested whether juries can actually implement deterrence by offering a set of
jury instructions to the jurors which directs the jury to consider the probability that a defendant would be
held liable for the harm it caused. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, REID HASTIE, JOHN W. PAYNE, DAVID A.
SCHKADE & W. KIP VISCUSI, PUNITIVE DAMAGES: HOW JURIES DECIDE 142–170 (2002). The scholars
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will admit it predicted it would be held liable only 30% of the time its harm
is caused, so it decided to not take the necessary precautions. So, the court
must use its resources to find this probability. Therefore, a simplified equation is needed with a specific way to identify the value of p.
Pursuant to the optimal level of care theory above, p is the probability
with which a court will hold the defendant liable. Potentially, to account for
p, a court could estimate the total number of potential trials a defendant
could face, as well as the number of those trials that would be decided in
favor of the plaintiff. The equation would be as follows:

Using this equation, a court could gather enough information to determine
p. For example, during the bifurcated punitive phase in Montana, instead of
gathering a defendant’s net worth, the court could require defendants to
submit the total number of times they have been sued regarding manufacturing or design defects over the past ten years.172 This would give a value
for the “total number of potential trials.” A court could also require defendants to calculate how many times those lawsuits turned into trials and how
often those trials resulted in a finding of liability against the defendant.173
This would give the “number of potential unfavorable outcomes.” While
this calculation of p may not be perfect, if a defendant is required to divulge
information about its potential liability, the process could allow an adjudicator to determine the value of p.
If this type of equation is implemented, it would eliminate the nebulous post-verdict review—the single-digit ratio doctrine and Gore guideposts—of each individual award. However, it is in the hands of legislatures
to implement this approach. Since there is unquestionably a multitude of
ways state legislatures limit punitive damages, an economic solution would
provide continuity.174 Abiding by an economic doctrine would allow for the
simulated mock trials and instructed the jury to consider the probability of detection—whether and to
what degree a corporation factored in the likelihood of detection when deciding to move forward with its
risky behavior. The scholars found that even when attorneys presented the jury with various scenarios in
which a defendant was held liable with some probability, and giving the jurors tables to aid them with
the probability calculations, the juries did not award the optimal level of punitive damages.
172. This equation merely addresses a potential way for courts to determine a defendant’s total
number of trials in products liability cases. In other cases, such as tortious interference or fraudulent
conduct, another method would be needed. Further, this possible solution for p does not account for the
acts of individual defendants against individual plaintiffs. In these limited circumstances, the numerator
and denominator would always be 1, so this specific equation would not suffice.
173. This implies that the defendant has some kind of trial history. Understandably, some defendants
have no trial history. Thus, another method would be necessary to determine an accurate amount for the
value of p.
174. See infra Appendix 2 for the various ways states limit punitive damages awards.
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calculation of punitive damages awards to be the same across the board, no
matter what state defendants may be in, and, consequently, defendants
could more easily predict what punitive liability they may face.
This author does not suggest that the economic theory of deterrence is
the grand solution to solve all problems associated with punitive damages
awards. However, if an equation were adopted that complies with the optimal utility equation, it would be a practical solution. Every jury trial opportunity injects subjectivity and arbitrary punitive damages verdicts. Thus, an
economic approach allows states minimum flexibility in adopting various
measures they determine appropriate for achieving the goals of punitive
damages; hence, providing more uniformity for punitive damages across the
United States. Accordingly, if the Montana Supreme Court ever finds Montana’s punitive damages cap unconstitutional, an economic solution would
be the best revision and provide an effective method for courts to evaluate a
jury’s punitive damages award during the post-verdict review stage.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Montana Supreme Court held that “[p]unitive damage awards
should not be a routine cost of doing business.”175 Yet, they are. Without a
significant revision or a complete elimination of Montana’s punitive damages cap, plaintiffs will continue to be treated differently, wealthy defendants will continue to benefit, and juries will have no real impact with their
punitive damages awards. Therefore, if Montana’s punitive damages cap is
ever held to be unconstitutional, modification of the statute should be the
legislature’s next step.
The potential for being liable for punitive damages is merely an economic formula depending on the jurisdictions to which the defendant is
subject. A defendant will commit the wrongful, malicious act if it is more
profitable to pay punitive damages than correct the wrong. Thus, an equation is needed that allows for an optimal punitive damages award: one that
not only adheres to welfare economics and the optimal utility equation, but
one that gives arbitrators the necessary tools to compute the best award
using an amount for compensatory damages and an amount for the likelihood a defendant will be held liable. This note suggests that a revision for
punitive damages limitations is needed and it should align with the economic theory of deterrence. Computing that economically efficient equation
is the next step. The author leaves this to economists, state legislatures, and
another paper.

175. Seltzer, 154 P.3d at 597 (quoting Simon v. San Paolo U.S. Holding Co., Inc., 113 P.3d 63,
78–79 (Cal. 2005)).
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environmental

YES. IND. CODE ANN.
§ 34–51–3–4.

NONE.

Limit on Punitives?
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Yes

Yes

Yes
No
Yes

Missouri

Montana

Nebraska

Nevada

Punitives

Mississippi

State
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3x compensatory if greater
than $100,000; $300,000 if
less than $100,000.

50% to state.
MO. REV. STAT.
§ 537.675(3).

Portion to State

Lesser of: $10 million or 3%
of a defendant’s net worth.

(i) $20 million for a
defendant with a net worth of
more than $1 billion;
(ii) $15 million for a
defendant with a net worth of
more than $750 million but
not more than $1 billion;
(iii) $5 million for a
defendant with a net worth of
more than $500 million but
not more than $750 million;
(iv) $3.75 million for a
defendant with a net worth of
more than $100 million but
not more than $500 million;
(v) $2.5 million for a
defendant with a net worth of
more than $50 million but not
more than $100 million; or
(vi) Two percent (2%) of the
defendant’s net worth for a
defendant with a net worth of
$50 million or less.

Cap at Defendant’s Net
Worth

MONTANA LAW REVIEW

YES. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 42.005.

Monetary
Cap

Seq: 32

NONE

YES. MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 27–1–220 (3).

Multiple of compensatory

358

unknown

NONE

YES. MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 11–1–65(3).

Limit on Punitives?
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No
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

New Jersey

New Mexico

New York

North Carolina

North Dakota

Ohio

Oklahoma

Punitives

New
Hampshire

State
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Category I: $100,000 or the
actual damages awarded
(whichever is greater);
Category II: or $500,000,
twice the amount of actual
damages, or the increased
financial benefit derived by
the defendant or insurer as a
direct result of the conduct
causing the injury to the
plaintiff; or Category III:
what judge finds reasonable

2x compensatory damages or
10 percent of the employer’s
or individual’s net worth
when the tort was committed
up to a maximum of
$350,000.

2x compensatory damages,
or $250,000, whichever is
greater

3x compensatory damages, or
$250,000, whichever is
greater.

5 x compensatory or
$350,000, whichever is
greater.

Multiple of compensatory

Monetary
Cap
Portion to State

Cap at Defendant’s Net
Worth

unknown

YES. OKLA. STAT. ANN. TIT.
23, § 9.1(B)–(D), called into
question by Moody v. Ford
Motor Co., 506 F. Supp. 2d
823, 849 (N.D. Okla. 2007).

YES. OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2315.21(D)(1), (2)(b).

YES. N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 32–03.2–11(4).

YES. N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 1D–25 (a)–(c) (2015).

NONE

NONE

YES. N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:15–5.14(b).

N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 507:16 (2016).

Limit on Punitives?
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Yes

Yes
No
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Pennsylvania

Puerto Rico

Rhode Island

South Carolina

South Dakota

Tennessee

Texas

Punitives

Oregon

State
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YES. TEX. CIV. PRAC. &
REM. CODE ANN. § 41.008.

The greater of: (1) 2x
compensatory plus any
noneconomic damages found
by the jury, not to exceed
$750,000; or (2) $200,000.

Nothing
above $500k
for med mal.
S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS
§ 21–3–11.

Monetary
Cap
60%

Portion to State

Cap at Defendant’s Net
Worth

unknown

NONE

None, only medical
malpractice.

NONE

Not to exceed twice the
actual loss and the unjust
enrichment. R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 6–41–3.

4x compensatory for online
non-physical harm. Goddard
v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Or.,
179 P.3d 645 (Or. 2008).

Multiple of compensatory

360

None, except malicious
misappropriation.

NONE

NONE

None, except common law
for non-physical harm.

Limit on Punitives?
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Yes

Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes

Vermont

Virginia

Washington

West Virginia

Wisconsin

Wyoming

Punitives

Utah

State
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NONE

NONE

NONE

NONE

YES. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 8.01–38.1. (2015).

None, statutory exceptions.

YES. Only common law
exception: Hall v. Wal-Mart,
Inc., 959 P.2d 109, 112 (Utah
1998).

Limit on Punitives?
3x compensatory

Multiple of compensatory

$350,000

Monetary
Cap
First $50,000 to
Plaintiff, then
Plaintiff and
State split
equally any
amount beyond
$50,000. UTAH
CODE §
78B–8–201(3)(a)
(2016).

Portion to State

Cap at Defendant’s Net
Worth
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APPENDIX 2.
Capping at a multiple of compensatory damages or a specified amount, whichever is greater
Alabama

ALA. CODE § 6–11–21(a), (d)
(2016).

3x or $500,000, whichever greater, for a nonphysical injury. 3x compensatory or 1.5
million, whichever is greater, for physical
injury.

Alaska

ALASKA STAT. ANN.
§ 09.17.020 (f).

3x or $500,000, whichever greater. 50% to a
state fund.

Arkansas

ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 16–55–201(b) (2015).

3x or $250,000, not to exceed 1 million

Florida

FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 768.73(1)(a)–(b) (2016).

3x compensatory or $500,000, whichever is
higher

Idaho

IDAHO CODE ANN.
§ 6–1604(3).

Greater of: 3x compensatory or $250,000

Indiana

IND. CODE ANN. § 34–51–3–4.

Greater of: 3x compensatory or $50,000. Then
75% to state fund.

Nevada

NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 42.005.

3x compensatory if greater than $100,000;
$300,000 if less than $100,000.

New Jersey

N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:15–5.14(b).

5 x compensatory or $350,000, whichever is
greater.

North Carolina

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1D–25
(a)–(c) (2015).

3x compensatory damages, or $250,000,
whichever is greater.

North Dakota

N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 32–03.2–11(4).

2x compensatory damages, or $250,000,
whichever is greater

Ohio

OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2315.21(D)(1), (2)(b).

2x compensatory damages or 10 percent of
the employer’s or individual’s net worth when
the tort was committed up to a maximum of
$350,000.

Oklahoma

OKLA. STAT. ANN. TIT. 23,
§ 9.1(B)–(D), called into
question by Moody v. Ford
Motor Co., 506 F. Supp. 2d
823, 849 (N.D. Okla. 2007).

Category I: $100,000 or the actual damages
awarded (whichever is greater); Category II:
or $500,000, twice the amount of actual
damages, or the increased financial benefit
derived by the defendant or insurer as a direct
result of the conduct causing the injury to the
plaintiff; or Category III: what judge finds
reasonable

Texas

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. § 41.008.

The greater of: (1) 2x compensatory plus any
noneconomic damages found by the jury, not
to exceed $750,000; or (2) $200,000.

Capping at only a multiple of compensatory damages
Colorado

COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN.§ 13–21–102(1)(a)
(2015).

1x compensatory

Iowa

IOWA CODE ANN. § 455B.392.

3x clean up costs for environmental claims.
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Maine

ME. REV. STAT.
§ 568(4)(B).

TIT.

38,

Oregon

Common law for non-physical
harm: Goddard v. Farmers Ins.
Co. of Or., 179 P.3d 645 (Or.
2008).

4x compensatory for online non-physical
harm.

Utah

Common law exception: Hall
v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 959 P.2d
109, 112 (Utah 1998).

3x compensatory

13:42

363

3x clean up costs in environmental cases.

Capping at some specified amount
Connecticut

Hanna v. Sweeney, 78 Conn.
492, 494, 62 A. 785, 786
(1906).

Costs of litigation and attorney’s fees.

Georgia

GA. CODE ANN.
§ 51–12–5.1(g).

$250,000. 75% to state fund.

Massachusetts

MASS. GEN. LAWS
§ 2 (2009).

South Dakota

S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 21–3–11.

$500,000 for medical malpractice claims

Virginia

VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01–38.1.
(2015) (Virginia’s statutory
cap on punitive damages was
upheld as constitutional in
Wackenhut Applied Techs.
Ctr., Inc. v. Sygnetron Prot.
Sys., Inc., 979 F.2d 980, 985
(4th Cir. 1992)).

$350,000

CH.

258,

$100,000 in actions against municipal entities
and the State.

Distinguishing between non-physical and physical harm
Alabama

ALA. CODE § 6–11–21(a), (d)
(2016).

3x or 500k, whichever greater, for a nonphysical injury. 3x compensatory or 1.5
million, whichever is greater, for physical
injury.

Oregon

Goddard v. Farmers Ins. Co.
of Or., 179 P.3d 645 (Or.
2008).

4x compensatory for online non-physical
harm.

Capping based on the defendant’s finances and/or net worth and a specified amount
Alabama

ALA. CODE § 6–11–21(b)-(c)
(2016).

Only for small businesses having a net worth
of $2 million or less at the time of the
occurrence. Lesser of: $50,000 or 10% of
defendant’s net worth.

Kansas

KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 60–3701(e).

Lesser of: (1) the highest annual gross income
earned by the defendant in past 5 years; or (2)
$5 million.
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Mississippi

MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 11–1–65(3).

(i) $20 million for a defendant with a net
worth of more than $1 billion;
(ii) $15 million for a defendant with a net
worth of more than $750 million but not more
than $1 billion;
(iii) $5 million for a defendant with a net
worth of more than $500 million but not more
than $750 million;
(iv) $3.75 million for a defendant with a net
worth of more than $100 million but not more
than $500 million;
(v) $2.5 million for a defendant with a net
worth of more than $50 million but not more
than $100 million; or
(vi) Two percent (2%) of the defendant’s net
worth for a defendant with a net worth of $50
million or less.

Montana

MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 27–1–220 (3).

Lesser of: $10 million or 3% of a defendant’s
net worth.

Diverting a portion of the punitive damages verdict to a state fund
Alaska

ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.020(j)
(2015).

50%

Georgia

GA. CODE ANN.
§ 51–12–5.1(e)(2) (2015).

75%

Illinois

735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/
2–1207 (2015).

The trial court has discretion to apportion
punitive damages among the plaintiff, the
plaintiff’s attorney, and the State of Illinois
Department of Human Services.

Indiana

IND. CODE ANN. § 34–51–3–6
(2015).

75%

Iowa

IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 668A.1(2)(b) (2015).

75%

Missouri

MO. REV. STAT. § 537.675(3)
(2016).

50%

Oregon

OR. REV. STAT. § 31.735
(2016).

30% to Plaintiff, 60% payable to the Attorney
General for deposit in the Criminal Injuries
Compensation Account of the DOJ, and 10%
is payable to the Attorney General for deposit
in the State Court Facilities and Security
Account and may only be used for specific
purposes.

Utah

UTAH CODE §
78B–8–201(3)(a) (2016).

First $50,000 to Plaintiff, then Plaintiff and
State split equally any amount beyond
$50,000.

Arizona

Some statutory exceptions. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-820.04; Cont’l
Nat’l Bank v. Evans, 489 P.2d 15 (Ariz. 1971).

California

Some statutory exceptions. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (2010).

Delaware

Some common law exceptions. See, e.g., Casson v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 455
A.2d 361, 368 (Del. Super. Ct. 1982).

Hawaii

Some statutory exceptions. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 662-2.

Illinois

Some statutory exceptions. See, e.g., 745 ILCS 10/2-102.

Iowa

Some statutory exceptions. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 455B.392 (2015).

No punitive damages cap
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Kentucky

Some statutory exceptions. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 411.184;
411.186.

Maine

Some statutory exceptions. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT.

Massachusetts

Some statutory exceptions. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS
(claims against municipal entities and the State).

Minnesota

Some statutory exceptions. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 466.04 (limits on
punitive damages against municipal entity).

Missouri

Some statutory exceptions. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 537.610 (2015).

New Mexico

Some statutory exceptions. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-19(d) (2016).

New York

Some common law exceptions. See, e.g., Bibeau v. Ward, 645 N.Y.S.2d 107
(N.Y. App. Div. 1996).

Oregon

Some statutory exceptions. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30.271(2) (2016)

Pennsylvania

Some statutory exceptions. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN.
(2016).

Rhode Island

Some statutory exceptions. See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6–41–3 (2015)
(malicious prosecution claims not to exceed twice the actual loss and the unjust
enrichment).

South Carolina

Some statutory exceptions. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-56-200(B)(1)
(2016).

South Dakota

Some statutory exceptions. See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21–3–11 (2015)
(medical malpractice claims).

Tennessee

Some statutory exceptions. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 9-8-307 (a)(3) (2016).

Vermont

Some statutory exceptions. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN.

West Virginia

Some statutory exceptions. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-17-1(a) (2016).

Washington
D.C.

Some common law exceptions. See, e.g., Walch v. Ford Motor Co., 627 F.
Supp. 1519 (D.D.C 1986).

Michigan

Generally, no. See Gregory v. Cincinnati Inc., 538 N.W.2d 325, 334 n.31
(Mich. 1995); Rafferty v Markovitz, 602 N.W.2d 367 (Mich. 1999); McPeak v.
McPeak, 593 N.W.2d 180, 184 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999); Bailey v. Graves, 411
Mich. 510, 515, N.W.2d 166 (1981).

Louisiana

LA. CIV. CODE ANN. ART. 3546 (2015) (unless authorized by the laws of
another state were injurious conduct occurred).

Nebraska

NEB. CONST. ART. VII § 5; Distinctive Printing & Packaging Co. v. Cox, 443
N.W.2d 566 (Neb. 1989).

New
Hampshire

N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:16 (2016).

Puerto Rico

Cruz v. Molina, 788 F. Supp. 122, 128 (D. P.R. 1992).

Washington

Dailey v. N. Coast Life Ins. Co., 919 P.2d 589, 590 (Wash. 1996) (en banc);
Barr v. Interbay Citizens Bank, 635 P.2d 441 (Wash. 1981).

TIT.

38, § 568(4)(B).

CH.

TIT.

TIT.

258, § 2 (2009)

35, § 6020.507(c)

12, § 5601(b) (2016).

No punitive damages awarded whatsoever
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